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Forests to the People: Decentralization and Forest 
Degradation in the Indian Himalayas 
Abstract 
 
Over the past decades, India and Nepal have embarked upon ambitious programs of 
decentralization over their forests by transferring management and use rights from 
the state to the local communities. Even though centralized forest management by the 
State suffers from a number of weaknesses, it is not clear that endowing local 
communities with long term rights over the forests necessarily leads to better 
outcomes in terms of resource degradation.  
In this paper, we compare the degradation of forests managed by local 
communities (Van Panchayats or VPs), relative to state forests in the Indian state of 
Uttarakhand. To this end, we use a unique data set including ground-level ecological 
measures of forest quality including canopy cover, biomass, lopping and 
regeneration. Controlling for forest geography, unobserved village characteristics 
and cross-forest spillovers, VP forests are 20—30% less lopped, and roughly  similar 
on other dimensions. The extent of lopping is important as it directly measures the 
short run impact on the forest of firewood and fodder collection by villagers. We also 
show that, for older VP, the lopping differences tend to translate into better long term 
biomass measures, such as the density of trees (basal area).  
 
 
 
 
 3
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Property rights and management of common property resources such as forests, 
fisheries and irrigation systems has become a central issue in development economics 
and policy. This owes both to the high degree of reliance of lives of the poor in rural 
communities in developing countries on these resources, as well as concerns for 
environmental sustainability.3 While there are many plausible causes of degradation 
of such resources such as population pressure, economic growth, commercial 
exploitation, socio-economic heterogeneity and government policies, an important 
determinant that has received much attention is the nature of property rights and 
control mechanisms. It is frequently argued that excessive state control and 
management of such resources has been associated with adverse incentive and 
monitoring systems, which have contributed to degradation of common property 
resources  (Ostrom (1990), Somanathan (1991), Gibson, McKean and Ostrom (2000), 
Jodha (2001), Shivakoti and Ostrom (2002)). This suggests the need for policies that 
allow local communities to own and manage these resources themselves.    
 
While questioning the performance of centralized states in managing common 
property resources, the literature on environmental resource management has been 
nuanced about the performance of decentralization policies and community-based 
management schemes. In their comprehensive analysis of case studies, for instance, 
Baland and Platteau (1996) argue that local communities are fairly deft in developing 
rules of allocation and distribution of the resource output across users, such as those 
described by Wade (1987) for South Indian irrigation collective schemes. It is 
tempting to generalize from the existence of such schemes (e.g., for rotating allocation 
of fishing spots) that local communities have a genuine capacity to satisfactorily 
manage common property resources. While distribution measures involve some 
protection of the resource, they are often inadequate in preserving the resource against 
strong market and population pressures. Baland and Platteau describe case-study-
based evidence that local communities tend to be much less successful in devising 
conservation measures, particularly in complex dynamic systems such as forests or 
fisheries.  
 
Other concerns have been voiced in the broader context of community-based 
development programs. In their recent critical review of such programs, Mansuri and 
Rao (2004) describe a range of possible weaknesses of community participation 
programs arising from lack of accountability of community leaders, local elite 
capture, deficiencies in local training, poor design and implementation. They also 
lament the lack of empirical studies that establish causal relationships between 
participatory elements and relevant outcomes. This results frequently from lack of 
availability of suitable data-sets with large samples and objective measures of 
resource stocks, and identification problems arising from endogenous treatment and 
unobserved heterogeneity.    
 
This paper focuses on the impact of Van Panchayats (VPs, or local forest councils) on 
forest degradation in Uttarakhand, the only Indian state characterized by such a 
                                                 
3 See Dasgupta (1996) and Dasgupta et al (2000) for an overview of these concerns. Jodha (1986, 2001) 
presents evidence that between 15-25% of the incomes of the rural poor in India depend on these 
resources. Beck and Nesmith (2001) survey evidence from various parts of India and West Africa, 
which indicate a similar range of dependence.     
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village community management system. These were first created in 1931 by the 
colonial British government, following large-scale protests by local populations at 
previous attempts of the government to convert forests to state property and impose 
restrictions on local use. A 1931 Act allowed a Van Panchayat to be formed following 
a collective application by at least one-third of the local community. Forest areas were 
subsequently transferred out of state control to the local council, which became 
responsible for regulating and monitoring use of the forest by members of the local 
community. Since Independence, the Indian government has continued to encourage 
the formation of Van Panchayats, based on the idea that community management can 
improve governance and prevent degradation of the forest stock. One-third of villages 
in the mid-Himalayan region of Uttarakhand have set up VPs. VP forests now co-exist 
with state forests, some of which are protected and others are not, and represent 11% 
of the total forest area in the state (Sarkar, 2008).  
 
Like much of the existing literature, we attempt to infer the effectiveness of local 
community management vis-à-vis state protection by comparing the condition of local 
forests under these two types of management. Our main contribution is two-fold, in 
comparison to most of the literature (reviewed in detail in Section 5). First, we rely on 
a random sample of relatively large size and geographic coverage, in contrast to many 
papers relying on case studies or restricted samples. Moreover we utilize detailed 
ground-level measures of forest quality conducted by trained ecologists, in contrast to 
subjective perception-based measurements of forest stocks by local community 
members, or aerial satellite images. Second, we explore possible biases associated 
with the self-formation of Van Panchayats (henceforth, VP), and problems of 
unobserved heterogeneity, to the extent feasible with a cross-sectional dataset. A few 
papers in the literature, notably Edmonds (2002) and Somanathan, Prabhakar and 
Mehta (2005), have also relied on large representative cross-sectional samples, and 
explored the robustness of findings with respect to these sources of bias. Our study 
complements theirs and emerges with broadly similar conclusions.        
  
Our study covers 399 forest patches, from a stratified random sample of 83 villages 
from the mid-Himalayan region (i.e., altitude between 1800 and 3000 metres) of 
Uttarakhand. Local residents of the sampled villages were asked to identify forest 
patches accessed by them. A team of ecologists then made direct measurements of 
canopy cover, biomass (basal area, basal volume), lopping and regeneration rate 
(number of saplings per hectare  above a certain height) at a number of randomly 
chosen transects within these patches. These forest surveys were complemented with 
household surveys and in-depth interviews with local population including distance to 
forests accessed and collection time per bundle of firewood.  
 
We find no significant quality differences between VP and non-VP forest patches, in 
the absence of any controls for species composition, aspect, altitude, slope and 
proximity to villages and roads. Adding geographic controls and village fixed effects 
shows an average tree in VP patches to be approximately 20% less lopped compared 
to those in state forests. Differences on other dimensions are statistically insignificant. 
This indicates that selection effects accounted for the lack of any difference in the raw 
lopping averages. Specifically, more degraded forests are more likely to be converted 
into VP forests. A direct comparison (using a conditional logit with village fixed 
effects) indicates a greater tendency for forest patches in closer proximity to the 
village to be VP forests. On the other hand, similar to Somanathan et al (2005) we 
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find no tendency for VP and non-VP broad-leaf forests to differ by aspect, altitude or 
slope. 
 
While Somanathan et al (2005) also control for geographical attributes of the forest 
and unobserved village characteristics, we additionally control for possible cross-
forest spillovers resulting from different forms of management. This incorporates the 
concern that the superiority of VP management is not properly measured by 
differences between VP and non-VP patches in the neighborhood of the same village, 
since the VP may enforce restrictions on access on its own patch that may induce 
villagers to substitute by extracting more from other neighboring patches. We control 
for the composition of other forests in the vicinity of the same village (i.e, state 
protected forest area, and VP areas, with unprotected forests constituting the residual 
category). We find that state-protected forests exhibited negative spillovers, while VP 
forests did not. This raises the estimated difference between VP and state protected 
forests even further to 28%.  
 
We perform another check for selection bias by distinguishing between old and new 
VPs. Selection effects are likely to dominate management effects for forests recently 
converted to VPs, since the effects of restraints enforced by VPs on firewood and 
fodder collection would take some time to manifest themselves in measured forest 
quality. For older VPs, factors guiding selection at the time of conversion should 
matter less, and management method should matter more. If observed differences are 
stronger for new VPs, it indicates a greater likelihood of having been driven by 
selection effects. We find the opposite: the differences are stronger for older VPs. 
This reinforces the inference that observed differences in lopping and regeneration 
reflect differences in mode of management rather than selection effects.          
 
Section 2 provides background information concerning forest management 
institutions in Uttarakhand. In section 3, we describe the context as well as the 
methodology of our survey. We also present descriptive statistics concerning 
measures of forest degradation in the region. The main regression results are 
presented in section 4. Section 5 then relates our study and findings to related 
literature. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. FOREST INSTITUTIONS IN UTTARAKHAND 
 
State forests are governed by the forest department.  The department has a 
hierarchical administrative structure. The lowest rung is occupied by the “forest 
guard” responsible for field operations on a day to day basis. A legacy of the colonial 
past, the department manages and monitors vast expanses of forests under its control. 
The main motive behind the department’s operations is conservation, though some 
commercialization objectives also exist. For instance, while there is a ban on green 
felling, the forest department can sell timber acquired through silviculture operations 
or through salvaging operations where the forest stock has been damaged due to 
natural calamities. In some pine forests, the department can extract and sell resin, an 
important ingredient in the manufacture of turpentine. Locals have “rights’ to access 
state forests for their livelihood needs. However, they have to abide by rules of 
extraction and use prescribed by the forest department (shown in Table A2 in the 
Appendix). Violation of such rules is a legal offence. The “forest guard” is the main 
interface between the locals and the higher authorities in the department. His main 
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role is to watch over the forest for detecting violations and imposing penalties on the 
accused.   
 
For historical reasons, state forests have been classified into ‘un-demarcated’ and 
‘demarcated’ patches.4 Un-demarcated forests are known as ‘Civil Soyam’ forests in 
Uttarakhand and are not marked by boundary pillars. The department cannot impose 
prohibitions on these patches as regards rights of access and use. In course of field 
work it was found that these were usually patches of forests between the village 
boundary and the demarcated state forest patches. A demarcated forest, which is 
marked by boundary pillars, is an area notified under the Indian Forest Act of 1927. 
Locals can access such forests unless prohibited.  For instance, the forest department 
can close plantation zones from use or stop the granting of timber rights from a 
degraded forest to promote regeneration.5 Demarcated forests are further categorized 
into ‘demarcated protected forests’ and ‘reserved forests’.6  As the name suggests, 
reserved forests have more restrictions on access and use and the forest department 
has the authority, if it wishes, to exercise maximum control on them but it can relax 
these norms. In Uttarakhand, most demarcated forest patches are ‘reserved forests’. 
 
Van Panchayat forests were first formed under the Van Panchayat act of 1931. The 
British had started intruding into local forest patches in large parts of Kumaon and 
parts of Garhwal areas of Uttarakhand, to cater to their imperial needs of timber and 
charcoal. They started demarcating forests for their own use. This sparked off a series 
of agitations by the local inhabitants who set forests on fire in protest. In a bid to 
pacify the villagers, the British set up a Grievance Committee which passed the Van 
Panchayat Act in 1931. Under this act, villagers can create community managed 
forests from forests controlled by the revenue department. The act entitles the 
villagers to demarcate the boundary of their panchayat forests, protect it from illegal 
tree felling, fires, encroachments and cultivation. Daily operations are chiefly 
governed by rules that village forest council have themselves crafted, often aided by 
government officials. The rules appear designed to ensure sustainable use of forest 
resources. In the case of firewood, extraction is restricted to ‘dry-wood’ only and, in 
the case of timber, only ‘dried-trees’ can be felled upon payment of a stipulated fee. 
There are quantitative restrictions on the extraction of firewood, fodder and leaf-litter. 
In some cases, the forest is divided into compartments and extraction is permitted on a 
rotational basis across these compartments so as to ensure sufficient time for 
regeneration of closed-compartments. Penalties are imposed in case of rule violations. 
A vigilance mechanism is usually required to make these rules fool-proof. For this 
                                                 
4 Forests were demarcated by the British to facilitate their timber felling operations in order to cater to 
their imperial needs of ship-building and construction of railways.  
5 Collective plantation programs initiated by the forest department for rejuvenating degraded patches of 
forests do not appear to have been successful. 72% of the villages reported no such programs. In those 
villages that reported the existence of these programs, 69% of respondents were of the opinion that they 
were marginally effective, and 20% believed they were ineffective. Such programs seem to have failed 
due to weak mobilization of the local community, poor post-plantation care and interference with 
villagers’ grazing zones and cattle-paths.  
6 When the Indian Forest Act of 1927 was promulgated, the basic objective was first to establish 
control over forests by notifying them as “protected”. Thereafter settlement operations were carried out 
that defined people’s rights on forests. Boundary pillars were put up and these were classified as 
‘demarcated protected forests’. Thereafter, well stocked forests with least human interference were 
identified and were classified as ‘reserved’. Forests were all rights of use are denied are declared a 
‘sanctuary area’. This information is based on discussions with Dr Pankaj Khullar, additional principal 
conservator of forests in  Himachal Pradesh. 
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purpose, either a guard is hired or there is informal monitoring by villagers. The local 
guard is usually hired through contributions made by local inhabitants or resources 
diverted from VP earnings.  
 
VPs are typically created in Civil Soyam forests in the vicinity of the villages. While a 
major objective is to rejuvenate and manage patches of Civil Soyam forests for local 
use, it also prevents neighbouring villages from intruding into this zone, once 
formally demarcated as a ‘Van Panchayat’ forest. Most of the VPs are fairly old and 
have been in existence for over 35 years, even though a significant number of them 
were created over the past decade as part of the Indian government policies to 
promote community participation in forest management.7  Interactions with the local 
inhabitants revealed that most of these VPs were formed by the villagers only after 
being motivated by the forest department. In our sample, 39 out of 45 VPs have been 
initiated in this manner. 
 
3. SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND FOREST DEGRADATION MEASURES 
 
3.1 Survey Design 
 
On the basis of Census of India village location maps and the corresponding 
topograhical maps of the Survey of India, we selected a stratified random sample of 
83 villages in Uttarakhand in the altitude-zone between 1800 and 3000 meters.  The 
stratification was based on three criteria: altitude, number of households, and distance 
to the nearest town. For each criteria the strata were formed so that equal number of 
villages belonged to each stratum. Then, villages were randomly chosen so as to be 
representative of the population joint distribution of the three criteria.  In the second 
stage, a random sample of 20 households was chosen in each village so as to be 
repesentative of the village joint distribution of household landholding and caste. 
Three sets of questionnaires were used in each village: (a) a household questionnaire 
dealing with the socio-economic structure of the household and its dependence on 
forests; (b) a village questionnaire designed to secure information on a host of village 
level characteristics such as demographic size, access to physical and social 
infrastructure, the market environment, and institutions of local governance; (c) an 
ecology questionnaire intended to gather quantitative and qualitative evidence on the 
condition of the forests accessed by the villagers.  This paper relies primarily on the 
data collected from the ecology questionnaire. 
 
Table 1 provides some details of the number and nature of forests surveyed. On 
average there were 5.6 forests accessed by one village, of which 2.6 were state forests, 
1.4 were VP forests, and the rest were Civil Soyam forests. About two-thirds of the 
forest species were broad-leaf rather than coniferous forests, the former providing 
greater utility to neighboring villagers owing to the superior quality of firewood and 
fodder. The forests were located on an average altitude of 2200 meters above sea-
level, at an average slope of 32 degrees, and an average aspect of 0.58 (where an 
                                                 
7 The 1976 and 2001 amendments make Van Panchayat formation much easier, and ensure greater 
control on the incomes generated and their uses for local development purposes (for more details, see 
Sarkar, 2008). 
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aspect of 1 is most conducive to vegetation growth, representing a direction between 
east and north).8  
 
For conducting the ecology surveys we employed ecologists from the local area, who 
identified and mapped local forest zones on the basis of local interactions. Ground 
level observations revealed considerable variations in density within forests. 
Depending on the size of the forest area, up to 6 random transects (100 meters in 
length) were laid in the forest and measurements at three equidistant plots (of 5.63 
meters radius) on the transect were recorded on species composition, canopy cover, 
basal area, heights and girths of trees above 3 meters in height and regeneration 
characteristics. Table A1 in the appendix shows that within-forest variance in these 
quality measures exceeds that between forests, indicating the importance of using 
multiple transects within each forest.   
 
Qualitative assessment of grazing, lopping, leaf-litter accumulation, timber extraction 
and evidence on natural calamities such as fire and snowfall damage to trees was also 
recorded at each plot in terms of a predetermined qualitative scale. The second part of 
the ecology surveys interviewed 3 to 4 members of each village with regard to their 
perceptions of changes in forest stock over the past quarter century and the nature of 
institutions governing access and use of the forest.  
 
Households in these villages were overwhelmingly involved in farming activities, 
with only 11% of household time allocated to non-agricultural occupations. 
Households were highly dependent on local forests for firewood, grazing and leaf-
fodder. Firewood was the only source of energy used for heating, and the major 
source for cooking. LPG was the main cooking fuel alternative, with 11% of the 
household using it as a primary source of cooking energy in summer (3% in winter). 
Over 84% of firewood, 77% of timber and 62% of leaf fodder were collected from 
local forests. In terms of biomass, timber extraction was less important, accounting for 
only one tenth the wood removed for firewood.9 Despite the fact that these areas are 
fairly disaster-prone, with half the villages experiencing natural disasters in the last 
five years, the latter played a relatively minor role in forest degradation.10  Hence 
firewood and fodder collection seemed to be the most important sources of forest 
degradation.  
 
From our community-representative interviews, 91% of respondents in Uttarakhand 
agreed that ‘in their villages the forest stock was depleting’, and 30% described forest 
                                                 
8 The lowest value of aspect is 0, corresponding to a direction of south to west. Such directions 
correspond to greater sunlight exposure, which lowers moisture content of the soil.  See Singh and 
Singh (1987) for further geographic details concerning vegetation in Himalayan forests.  
9 The household responses indicated one tree equivalent of timber used by a household every five 
years. Based on an assumption of three ton weight per tree, and 80 households per village, timber use 
accounted for biomass removal of 48 tons per village per year, compared with 456 tons for firewood 
removal. 
10The ecologists visually estimated different sources of tree degradation, using a qualitative scale from 
categories 0 to 3 (with 0 denoting no degradation, 1 denoting low degradation, 2 denoting moderate 
degradation, and 3 denoting high degradation). Categories of sources considered were grazing, leaf 
litter removal, lopping, timber removal, natural calamity (fire and snowfall). The forest average score 
for grazing was 1.9, for lopping was 2.29, and timber was 1. The forest average scores for degradation 
resulting from fire was only 0.55 and from snow was 0.56. 
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degradation over the past quarter century as ‘drastic’. Collection levels per household 
have declined on average by about 36% and mean collection times for firewood 
increased by over 60%. Forest degradation, in the sense of lower forest quality, is 
much more serious than deforestation, i.e. shrinking forest area, since distance to the 
forest increased by less than 10% in the meantime. This indicates households were 
spending more time inside the forest looking for firewood. Declining quality of the 
forest rather than shrinking forest boundaries (resulting from encroachment) thus 
appears to be the dominant problem.11  
 
3.2 Measures of Forest Degradation 
 
Degradation has various dimensions that are difficult to represent by a single measure.  
Canopy cover (crown cover) is the principal measure used by the Forest Survey of 
India (FSI), as well as by Somanathan et al (2005, 2006) on the basis of aerial satellite 
images. Our study is based instead on direct ground-level measures of forest quality 
on five different dimensions of forest quality: canopy cover, height, girth and species 
of trees, lopping and regeneration rates. We describe these below. 
 
Canopy cover is defined as the amount of ground area covered by the spread of tree 
branches and leaves, as viewed from above. A mirror with grids of equal size was 
used to determine the canopy cover from the ground-level, so as to record the 
proportion of grids covered by tree canopies within each plot.  FSI uses a threshold of 
40% to denote a severely degraded forest, while Somanathan et al (2005) take canopy 
cover above 80% as an indicator of a well-stocked forest. Accordingly we may 
distinguish between severely degraded, degraded and healthy forests, using 40% and 
80% as the corresponding cutoffs. There appears to be more consensus among 
ecologists concerning the latter cutoff, i.e., that long-term growth of the forest is not 
hampered by canopy covers in the range 80—100%. For this reason, the tables below 
will provide proportions of forests that lie below the 80% cutoff.  
 
Basal area and volume represent tree biomass, a second important dimension of tree 
quality. Basal area is defined as the sectional area at breast height of all trees put 
together per unit area.12 Basal area estimates above 40 mts2  per hectare are considered 
by forestry experts to be indicative of good bio-mass potential of a forest (Thadani 
and Ashton (1995)). We augment this measure by multiplying the height of each tree 
with its basal area to obtain a measure of basal volume, which is a more accurate 
measure of tree biomass as it incorporates possible loss of height due to excessive 
lopping. As we will see in Table 3 below, these two measures are highly correlated. 
 
Lopping is the third dimension of degradation. To measure lopping, a visual scale was 
constructed: each tree encountered in the sample plots was classified into grade-1 if 
the extent of lopping was less than 30% (mid value 15%) of the tree height, grade-2 if 
the tree was 30-70% (mid value 50%) lopped and grade-3 if the tree height was over 
70% (mid value is 85%) lopped. Grade 1 does not affect long-term growth while 
                                                 
11 From the household surveys, only 3% of land holdings of households were reported to have been 
obtained by encroaching  (forests or village commons).  This amounts to less than an acre per village. 
94% of land was acquired through inheritance. While these data may well understate the extent of 
encroachment, they suggest that it was a comparatively insignificant source of shrinking forest area.  
12 During field work, we measured the girth at breast height of all trees above three meters in height, 
thereby ignoring smaller trees.  
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grade 3 negatively affects survival of the tree. Grade 2 is the middle range where 
growth is affected negatively (height and girth of trees get stunted) but the effect on 
sustainability is uncertain (Thadani (1999)) 13,14.  For each forest parcel we surveyed, 
we then computed the average value of the lopping measure, which gives us the 
average extent of lopping in that parcel.  
 
Regeneration is another indicator of sustainability of forest stock. The regeneration 
rate is measured by the number of saplings per hectare above the height of 0.50cm.  A 
value of 500 indicates abnormally low regeneration, while above 2000 indicates 
healthy regeneration (Thadani and Ashton (1995)).  
 
A final measure of degradation is the amount of time taken by neighboring villagers 
to gather a bundle of firewood normally carried by adults (approximately 35 
kilograms) from within the forest. More time is spent gathering a given amount of 
firewood within a more degraded forest, as villagers have to search more to find good 
trees, or have to climb to a higher level of each tree in order to lop off branches. The 
village questionnaires included collection times per bundle reported for each forest 
patch accessed by a sample of surveyed villagers. These collection times include time 
to walk to the forest. Controlling for distance of each forest to the village, variations 
in reported collection times provide a measure of variations in within-forest gathering 
times. However, there are no sustainability benchmarks available from forestry 
scientists concerning gathering times.    
 
Our data also includes the percentage of broad-leaf species in the forest, based on the 
trees inspected by the ecologists in the areas around each transect.  In the regressions, 
we control for the broad-leaf component of the forest, since broad-leaved forests tend 
to be more useful and therefore more degraded than coniferous forests.15  
 
Table 2 provides averages of all six measures of forest quality in our sample. In 
Figures 1 to 3, we also present the distribution of the forests for the three main 
measures: canopy cover, basal area and lopping. The average canopy cover is 
alarmingly low, as it lies below 40%, indicating severe degradation. There is no forest 
with a canopy cover exceeding 80%, which is the threshold defining a healthy 
untouched forest.  By contrast, in terms of basal area, the forests appear relatively 
healthy, with the mean basal area above the threshold of 40 square meters per hectare. 
More than half of the forests are above this threshold. Sustainability thresholds for 
basal volume are not available from forestry specialists, so we cannot assess 
degradation in terms of basal volume. However, basal area and basal volume are 
highly correlated (see Table 3 below), indicating that with regard to biomass the 
Uttarakhand forests are comparatively less degraded. With regard to lopping, the 
average tree is 65% lopped, with almost all forests lopped more than 30%. The extent 
                                                 
13 See for instance, Kumar and Shahabuddin (2005), who show high grazing and firewood extraction 
are associated with low canopy cover, low height and girth of trees in the Sariska Tiger Reserve forests 
in northern India. 
14 Scientific work on what values of these measures indicate lack of sustainability in our area of study 
is limited. Our survey and the cutoffs used for measures indicative of degradation in our area have used 
the field experience of Dr. R. Thadani.  
15 Coniferous species have lower calorific value, burn more quickly owing to presence of resin, and 
produce sparks. They are also a poor source of leaf fodder and litter, with a lower nutrient content, and 
a lower rate of decomposition.  
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of degradation therefore seems severe on this dimension. It is also severe with regard 
to regeneration rates, the average lying below the 500 threshold for severe 
degradation, no forest crossing the 2000 threshold which corresponds to healthy 
regeneration. Finally, the average time to collect a bundle of firewood (around 35 kgs) 
is close to 4 hours. The household questionnaire data indicate that collection times 
have increased by approximately 60% over the past quarter century, while distance to 
the forest has not appreciably changed. This suggests forests have become 
progressively more degraded in recent decades. 
 
In summary, we have substantial evidence of degradation of trees, judged by canopy 
cover, lopping and regeneration.  In contrast, in terms of biomass, the extent of 
degradation seems less severe. This indicates that degradation measures based on 
forest biomass alone miss significant dimensions of forest quality. Moreover, the 
measures used here are not strongly correlated with one another, indicating the need 
to measure them separately in order to evaluate VP management. Table 3 reports the 
correlation coefficients across the different measures used. Basal area and basal 
volume have a correlation of 0.90, and lopping and canopy cover have a correlation of 
-0.59. Apart from these pairs, all others have substantially lower correlations.  In 
particular, it is worth noting that collection times are hardly correlated with the other 
measures of degradation.16  
 
4. REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table 4 displays differences between the three principal types of forests with regard to 
the various degradation measures, without controlling for any other forest attributes.  
The differences on most dimensions appear marginal and are not statistically 
significant. VP forests have marginally lower canopy cover than demarcated state 
forests, but are slightly less lopped and have a higher regeneration rate.  
 
These raw differences reflect the joint effects of forest geography, forest management, 
household extraction activities and related community characteristics. In particular 
they may conceal important differences in geographic characteristics across VP and 
non-VP forests. The last four rows of Table 4 indicate that VP and Civil Soyam 
forests are significantly more broad-leaved and closer to the village than state 
demarcated forests. With respect to aspect, altitude and slope they are similar. Hence 
VP and Civil Soyam forests are likely to be more highly valued by local villagers, 
which is likely to translate into greater degradation. We therefore need to control for 
underlying geographical attributes in assessing the effectiveness of VPs.   
 
Table 5 shows simple OLS regressions of the six different quality measures of forest 
patches on forest type, controlling for aspect, altitude, slope, village population 
density, proximity to roads, and distance of the forest patch from the village. The 
different forest types considered are VP forests and Civil Soyam forests, with state 
protected forests constituting the control type. These regressions also provide 
estimates of the effect of geographical attributes on forest degradation. Controlling for 
all the other attributes, broad-leaved forests are significantly more likely to be lopped 
and have lower biomass, while exhibiting higher regeneration rates. Superior aspect is 
                                                 
16 As a result, the strength of a possible feedback effect from forest degradation on firewood collection 
through increased collection costs is weakened. 
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associated with higher bio-mass and higher regeneration rates. Higher altitude forests 
have greater canopy cover and biomass, are lopped more, and regenerate better. More 
distant forests have superior biomass.    
 
Controlling for these geographic attributes, Table 5 shows that VP forests are 
significantly less lopped than state protected forests, and are statistically 
indistinguishable on all other dimensions. The lopping rate is lower by  4.2 percentage 
points, against an average lopping rate of 65%, which amounts to a 6% difference. 
Hence if we compare a state protected forest and a VP forest of similar geographical 
attributes, the VP forest exhibits less extraction of firewood and fodder. On the other 
hand, comparing  Van Panchayat and Civil Soyam forests with a paired-t test (not 
reported in the table), we find that the two types of forests are similar with respect to 
all measures of degradation.  
 
The regression results in Table 5 are subject to at least three potential sources of bias. 
First, it is possible that villages with lower forest quality (for instance due to the 
unmeasured pressure of neighboring villages, or inability of the community to restrict 
extraction activities via informal means) or with superior ‘social capital’ tend to have 
more VP forests. Second, even within a given village area, more degraded patches 
may be more likely to be converted into VP forests. Third, there may be spillovers 
from VP forests to other forests in the neighboring area: regulations concerning use of 
a given VP forests may cause villagers to switch their collections to the other forests 
in the vicinity. We address each of these possible biases below.17 
 
We control for the first source of bias associated with unobserved heterogeneity in 
village characteristics by including village fixed effects in the regression. Table 6 
reports the results obtained under this new specification, which effectively compares 
different forest patches of similar attributes adjoining the same village area. The 
estimated difference in lopping between VP patches and state protected patches now 
increases to 10.2 percentage points, and collection times are lower by 0.4 hours. On 
other dimensions the differences are statistically insignificant.  Our estimates also 
imply that, in the vicinity of any given village, VP forests are superior to Civil Soyam 
forests with regard to canopy cover by 14.3% (p-value= .07) and are 12.5% less 
lopped (p-value=.02). Since crown cover and canopy cover are closely related, the 
former result is similar to the findings of Somanathan et al (2005). In addition, we 
find significant improvements on the lopping dimension compared to both state 
demarcated and Civil Soyam forests.  
 
The differences in results between Table 5 and 6 indicate the importance of 
unobserved village characteristics.  Hence, from now on, we focus on the village fixed 
effect specification. It is also worth noticing that Table 6 shows no significant 
difference between Civil Soyams and state reserved forests. This finding is consistent 
with many of our survey interviews. Our field investigators came away with the 
impression that there was little distinction made by villagers between different types 
of state forests. They seemed aware of the administrative status of the forest but not 
particularly of the underlying restrictions associated with each type. Thus, a forest 
                                                 
17 Finally, it is possible that some types of  forests are more susceptible to be used by residents from 
neighboring villages. We also ran the regressions displayed in Tables 4-12 by also including the 
number of neighboring villages having access to the same forest. For the sake of brevity, these results 
are not reported here, but they closely parallel those presented below. 
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official remarked: “for a villager, a forest is a forest!” Moreover, monitoring by the 
forest guards appointed by the forest department was reported to be weak. The 
proportion of villages in which monitoring of firewood extraction in state forests was 
perceived by villagers as `poor’ was as high as 98%. With respect to timber extraction 
and medicinal herbs collection, monitoring was reported `poor’ in 68% and 78% of 
the forests, respectively.   
 
The second source of bias is the possible endogeneity of forest boundaries between 
VP and non-VP patches within a given village. A VP once formed may wish to draw 
boundaries so as to appropriate the better part of the forest for itself, leaving the 
poorer quality parts in the state forest. Or the Forest Department which actually draws 
the boundaries may willfully create the opposite pattern.18  Somanathan et al (2005) 
argue that if there was a systematic tendency for forest boundaries to be drawn to 
include or exclude high quality forests from VP areas, this would tend to be 
manifested in systematic differences in those attributes strongly correlated with forest 
quality, such as aspect or altitude. They found that state protected forests tended to 
exhibit better aspect (i.e., were more north-facing), indicating that selection bias 
associated with endogenous local boundaries resulted in an underestimate of the 
benefits of VP management.    
 
Table 4 showed little differences in raw averages of aspect or altitude between VP and 
non-VP forests.  Table 7 explores these differences more carefully, using a 
conditional logit with village fixed effects, which predicts the likelihood of a forest 
patch being under VP management on the basis of observed geographical attributes.19 
It shows no significant association with aspect, slope or altitude, unlike the findings of 
Somanathan et al (2005). However we do find a strong correlation with the distance 
from the village: as shown in Table 4, VP forests are on average 1.3 km closer to the 
village than the state forests and about the same distance as Civil Soyam forests. Since 
human pressures on the forest tend to increase in proximity of the villages, this 
indicates a tendency for more degraded patches to be converted to Van Panchayat 
forests. Of course, Tables 5 and 6 already controlled for distance to the village from 
the forest patches and hence reduced the bias due to the possible endogeneity of forest 
boundaries. 
 
Next, we address the concern that the superior quality of VP forests relative to other 
forests in the same vicinity may reflect negative spillovers. If villagers respond to 
restrictions on firewood and fodder collection in VP forests by switching their 
extraction to other forests, previous estimates of benefits of VP management are 
upward biased. Table 8 augments the regressions in Table 7 to include composition of 
other forest area in the same village between Van Panchayat, Civil Soyam and 
protected state forests. We also control for relative distances to the village, by 
controlling for the average distance of all the local patches to the village.  
 
Table 8 shows that these additional controls further increase the estimated coefficient 
of the VP dummy on lopping reduction to 13 percentage points relative to state 
forests. But there is no statistically significant difference between Civil Soyam and 
                                                 
18 Alternatively, one might argue that the state had a vested interest in showing that decentralization 
works, and therefore selected better forests for conversion.  
19 In our data, aspect is measured on average across the forest, not at the boundaries.  This is because 
our unit of observation is the village and the forests to which it has access .  
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VP forests. Moreover, VP forests have no significant spillovers on the other forests 
except in the case of basal area. The superiority of VP over state forests with regard to 
lopping cannot thus be attributed to negative externalities. Protected state forests on 
the other hand have strong negative spillovers with regard to canopy cover and 
lopping on neighboring forests, which can perhaps be attributed to better enforcement 
of protective measures in those forests. This again reinforces the positive impact of 
VPs on forest degradation relative to the state protected forests. Conversion of a state-
protected forest into a VP forest will enable the negative spillovers of the former to be 
avoided. The magnitude of these spillovers is, however, small relative to the direct 
effects.  
 
As a final check for the importance of selection effects, we examine an important 
source of possible heterogeneity of the effect of VP management: the length of time 
that a VP has been in existence. There is considerable heterogeneity in ages of VPs in 
our sample. Some VPs have been in existence since the 1930s, while others have been 
started under the active encouragement of the Indian government since the 1970s. 
Table 9 displays the dates of creation of the VPs. More than half were started before 
1970, and every decade since then has witnessed creation of some new ones. 
  
The effect of VP management in restricting firewood and fodder collection by local 
villagers is likely to take some time to manifest itself in measures of forest quality. As 
more time goes by, these effects should become more important, while selection 
effects operating on construction of forest boundaries should become less important. 
Hence one way to gauge the relative effects of forest selection and VP management is 
to separate old and new VPs, vis-à-vis other types of forest management.   
 
Table 10 shows the effects of separating effects of old and new VPs, where `old’ is 
defined as having been in existence for over 25 years. The differences in effects are 
more pronounced for old VPs, with regard to canopy cover and lopping. The 
difference in lopping between old VPs and state protected forests now expands to 18.3 
percentage points, amounting to a 28% difference relative to the mean lopping rate. In 
contrast, the lopping difference between new VPs and state protected forests is much 
smaller (6.7 percentage points, contrasted to 18 percentage points for old VPs). Basal 
area in the new VP forests is significantly lower than state protected forests. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that more degraded forests are more likely to 
be converted to VP forests, and VP management subsequently improves forest 
quality, bringing them back on par with other forests. They are not consistent with the 
opposite hypothesis that better forests tend to be converted to VP forests and VP 
management subsequently causes them to become more degraded.  
 
5. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
There is relatively little evidence available from large-scale statistical surveys 
concerning the relative effectiveness of local community management, vis-à-vis state 
management. Much of the evidence in the literature is based on case-studies, small 
samples or surveys of geographically narrow areas (e.g., Gibson, McKean and Ostrom 
(2000), Jodha (2001), Ostrom (1990), Shivakoti and Ostrom (2002), Somanathan 
(1991), Varughese and Ostrom (2001)). Some case studies of Uttarakhand forests 
support the view that VPs perform relatively well compared to the state forest 
department in protecting local forests (e.g., Somanathan (1991)). However, other case 
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studies often report that VP performance varies widely across villages, with 
indications of serious degradation for a significant number of local forests. There is 
also a view that decentralized management mechanisms, where they exist, are eroding 
under population pressure and market integration (Britt-Kapoor, 1994; Singh, 1999; 
Ballabh et al, 2002; Agarwal, 2006). Apart from the narrow geographical area and 
small sample coverage, these studies are usually based on villagers’ perceptions of 
local forests and VP operations.   
 
Some studies of forest governance utilize data from larger samples drawn from larger 
geographical areas, but restrict themselves to cross-sectional comparisons across 
different types of VP forests, based on qualitative perceptions-based data concerning 
the state of the forest stock (e.g., Agrawal and Yadama (1997), Agrawal and Chhatre 
(2006)). Agrawal and Yadama, for instance, examine 279 VP forests in the Kumaon 
region of Uttarakhand, and compare a dichotomous response of local residents 
concerning their perception of the state of the forest across various aspects of the VP, 
such as size of the user group, VP age, number of months it hired a forest guard and 
number of annual meetings, after controlling for population pressure and distance to 
the forest from a paved road. They find that older VPs and those hiring more guards 
were associated with a better forest stock. Agrawal and Chhatre examine local 
perceptions of forest condition in a non-random sample of 95 forests in the 
neighboring state of Himachal Pradesh that were managed by local communities. 
After controlling for geographic, demographic and socio-economic village 
characteristics, they find a better forest condition in those areas where community 
management has been in existence for a longer time, and is subject to greater internal 
competition for official positions, but a poorer condition in those that hire guards or 
impose more fines.20    
 
Reliance on subjective perceptions of local villagers to measure forest quality is 
fraught with a number of possible biases. Those participating actively in a local user 
group council may be pre-disposed to view the forest condition in a favorable light. 
Moreover, respondents often tend to mix means with the ends, depending on whether 
they focus on VP activities (e.g. the existence of explicit rules) or its impact on the 
forest (e.g. forest degradation). If the VP forest is well managed informally, the VP 
does not need to impose many rules and may appear as relatively inactive. 
Conversely, if the forest is badly degraded, the VP may be very active in strictly 
enforcing rules. In these two situations, the VP can be considered as ‘effective’ or 
‘ineffective’ depending on the respondent’s point of view. In this sense, the 
‘effectiveness’ of the VP is very hard to assess without an independent, objective 
survey of the forest. This highlights the importance of using ecological measures of 
forest quality, collected by an outside team of trained ecologists. 
 
The other major problem with cross-sectional comparisons of forests across different 
management types is the bias resulting from unobserved cross-village heterogeneity 
and endogenous selection. The local community is required to organize itself and 
apply to form a VP, and works in collaboration with the state Forest department to 
draw up boundaries between state forests and VP forests. Little is known about how 
the selection process actually operates on the ground and what biases it might give 
                                                 
20 They explain the latter result in terms of possible endogeneity of  monitoring and fines: better forests 
are in better condition because of lower levels of extraction of firewood and fodder, which in turn 
necessitate less monitoring and enforcement activities.  
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rise to. It is possible that villages with superior `social capital’ organize to form VPs: 
these village communities could be more successful in devising informal means of 
inducing greater restraint among households with respect to their extraction practices. 
In that case the differences between VP forests and non-VP forests proxy partly the 
effect of differences in local `social capital’, thus over-estimating the benefits of VP 
management per se. Alternatively, villages neighboring more degraded forests may 
have a stronger incentive to form a VP, and the concerned VP may be motivated to 
monitor and enforce rules more actively. This would impart a negative correlation 
between forest condition and measures of VP existence or operation (analogous to 
those found by Agrawal and Chhatre (2006)). Similar biases would obtain if the state 
Forest department has a vested interest in keeping better forests under its own control, 
and deny help to VPs.  
 
A few papers attempt to confront these problems. In the context of local infrastructure 
projects in northern Pakistan, Khwaja (2006) uses physical measurements of 
infrastructure and its maintenance by an external team of engineers. He controls for 
unobserved community characteristics by using community fixed effects, and 
compares projects within the same community but with differing extents of 
community participation. He finds that projects with greater community participation 
are in better condition if the technical issues involved are negligible, and in worse 
condition if they are significant. In the context of forest degradation in Nepal, 
Edmonds (2002) and Baland et al (2007) use data from household responses to 
questions concerning firewood extraction, and relate these to existence of self-
governing forest user  groups, controlling for a range of household and community 
characteristics.21 Baland et al (2006) extend this approach to the mid-Himalayan 
ranges of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, using data which overlaps with that 
used in this paper. All these papers estimate a 10-15% reduction in firewood 
extraction associated with the existence of a self-governing user group. Nevertheless, 
the dependent variable in these papers is the extent of firewood extraction by 
neighboring households, rather than direct measures of the forest stock. Firewood 
collection by neighboring villagers is one possible source of forest degradation among 
many others (such as natural calamities, logging, timber removal); there is no firm 
evidence of its relative significance. This paper complements the literature by 
examining evidence directly on forest quality rather than on firewood collection levels 
of residents (as done, e.g., in Baland et al (2006)).  
 
The paper most closely related to ours is Somanathan, Prabhakar and Mehta (2005) 
which also focuses on forest stock measurement. They use satellite-based measures of 
vegetation indices (commonly used to predict canopy cover of forests) over 
geographical regions spanning VP and non-VP forests, from a large random sample 
covering a wide area in Uttarakhand. This enables them to avoid subjective 
perception-based measures of local forest quality, and problems of narrow geographic 
coverage. Moreover, they control for a number of geographical attributes (such as 
slope, aspect, altitude and distance from the village) that affect forest quality, and 
unobserved village characteristics by using village fixed effects. They find that VP 
broad-leaved forests had better crown cover compared with unprotected broad-leaved 
forests, and about the same as state protected forests. Moreover, they find that VP and 
                                                 
21 Edmonds uses a number of methods to control for endogeneity bias, such as a comparison between 
communities forming user groups at different points of time, and instruments (such as distance to a 
forest range post) for user group formation.  
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non-VP forests did not differ systematically with respect to altitude, aspect and slope, 
suggesting there was little bias caused by endogenous selection of forest boundaries 
within the vicinity of a given village. They conclude that VPs were at least as 
effective as the state forest department in managing forests, though at much lower 
cost. 
 
This paper complements Somanathan et al (2005) by utilizing more precise,  ground-
level measurement of forest quality using various measures that capture more 
dimensions of forest quality, and a larger variety of  controls for endogenous 
selection. The satellite-based vegetation index they use is a predictor of canopy cover 
of the forest, whereas we measure canopy cover directly. Apart from this, the 
regeneration potential of the forest depends on many other dimensions that cannot be 
captured by satellite data. Lower branches of trees can be severely lopped, while 
trunks and tree crowns are left intact. Such trees have few chances of survival in the 
medium term, yet will not be reflected in current canopy cover estimates. The 
collection of leaf-litter for fodder or grazing often restricts the growth of saplings at 
the foot of the tree, ultimately restricting the future growth of the tree, and making 
forests vulnerable to invasion by inferior species. Effects of severe lopping or leaf-
litter collection today are likely to persist for many decades due to likely regeneration 
failure of the stable forest species (Thadani (1999), Thadani and Ashton (1995), Singh 
and Singh (1987)). Our ability to measure lopping and regeneration enables us to 
compare VP and non-VP forests on these dimensions in addition to canopy cover and 
tree biomass, and we do find significant differences with regard to these dimensions. 
These findings reinforce the view expressed in their paper, concerning the 
effectiveness of VP management. 
 
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
In this paper, we investigated the impact of community management on forest 
degradation in the Indian Himalayas. More precisely, we compared forests managed 
by local communities to those managed by the State forest department in the Indian 
state of Uttarakhand. Our results are based on a unique data set collected directly at 
the forest level, on a wide range of forest quality measures. As in Somanathan et al 
(2005), we find little differences across forests in terms of canopy cover, the measure 
usually used in satellite imagery. By contrast, with regards to lopping, the most direct 
measure of human pressure due to firewood and fodder collection, we find that VP 
forests are significantly less degraded than state protected forests.  
 
Successive controls for unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous selection of forest 
type increased the estimated differences between VP and other forest types. The 
results were also robust with respect to controls for possible local spillover effects 
across forest types. The quantitative magnitude of the difference in lopping is about 
20%? This difference is more pronounced for older VPs that also exhibit a better 
measure of canopy cover, consistent with the view that these differences reflect the 
impact of community management per se rather than selection effects. 
 
These results are also corroborated by other studies of firewood and fodder collection 
by neighboring households (Baland et al (2006)). There, it is found that proximity to 
Van Panchayat forests was associated with significantly lower use of firewood 
compared with state forests, after controlling for household, village and forest 
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characteristics. Those estimates imply that conversion of state protected forests to VP 
forests would be associated with a 20% reduction in firewood collections. This is 
roughly the same order of magnitude of the estimated difference in extent of lopping 
that we found here. Edmonds (2002) found an 11% reduction in household firewood 
extraction in Nepal forest user groups. 
 
Local community management thus appears to be an attractive option as a means of 
halting forest degradation in the Himalayas, particularly when account is taken of the 
costs incurred by the State Forest Department. However, some words of caution are in 
order. First, the use of cross-sectional data will always leave room for possible biases 
resulting from unobserved heterogeneity. We have controlled for unobserved village 
level characteristics with the use of village fixed effects, and for endogenous selection 
of forest types by a variety of indirect methods. Panel data or use of randomized 
treatments would be needed to reduce these biases even further. However, the effects 
of community management may take a long time to manifest themselves, and may 
exhibit considerable heterogeneity across regions, so the scope for randomized 
treatment evaluations are limited unless the experiments are conducted over a wide 
geographic area and over long spans of time. Second, the ecological benefits from 
conversion to local community management may take a long time to materialize, 
while alternative policies may yield quicker and larger benefits. Baland et al (2006) 
estimated that a 33% subsidy on LPG cylinders would moderate firewood collection 
by more than a conversion of all state-protected forests to VP forests. By acting on 
household incentives directly, such energy policies may therefore be more effective 
than community management initiatives. Moreover, the scope for converting state 
forests to Van Panchayats is limited by the willingness of the local community to 
organize itself to form and manage a Van Panchayat, particularly when they have not 
done so in the past.  
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Table 1: Forest Characteristics 
 
  Mean Standard deviation
Forests per village 5.57 1.93 
State forests per village 2.57 1.99 
Civil Soyam forests per village 0.84 1.66 
Van Panchayat forests per village 1.4 1.64 
% Broad-leaf species in a forests 64.4 40.47 
Aspect* 0.58 0.4 
Altitude (meters) 2200.49 301.78 
Slope (degree) 32.4 4.95 
Distance to village centre (km) 2.21 1.54 
Number of villages 83 
Number of observations 399 
*: Aspect equals 1 if it is most conducive to vegetation growth (from east to north), 
zero if it is least conducive to growth (south to west) and 0.5 for combinations of the 
two (SE or NW).   
 
Table 2: Descriptive Measures of Forest Degradation 
 
  Mean Median  
Proportion of degraded 
forests* 
% Canopy 
Cover 
37.79 
(11.11)                 37.5 100 
Basal Area 
(m2/ha) 
46.79 
(24.61) 41.31 47.12 
Basal Volume 
(m3/ha) 
904.59 
(867.49) 671.58 na 
% Lopped 
65.39 
(13.17) 67.11 99 
Regeneration 
rate (number of 
saplings above 
0.5m/ha) 
440.75 
(317.42) 383.33 100 
Collection 
Time (hours) 
3.89 
(1.23) 4 na 
Number of Observations: 399.  
*:Degradation thresholds: Canopy cover below 80%, Basal area below 40 m2/ha, 
Lopping above 30%, Regeneration rate below 2000/ha. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of forests according to canopy cover 
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Figure 2: Distribution of forests according to basal area 
0
10
20
30
Pe
rc
en
t
0 50 100 150 200 250
basal_area
 
 24
Figure 3: Distribution of forests according to lopping 
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Table 3: Coefficients of correlation between measures of forest quality  
 
  
Canopy 
Cover 
Basal Area
 
Basal 
Volume 
Lopping
 
Regeneration 
 
Collection 
Time 
% Canopy Cover 1.00      
Basal Area (m2/ha) 0.32 1.00     
Basal Volume 
(m3/ha) 0.25 0.90 1.00    
% Lopped -0.59 -0.21 -0.16 1.00   
Regeneration 
(number of saplings 
above 0.5m/ha) 
0.04 -0.12 -0.23 -0.10 1.00  
Collection Time 
(hours) 0.06 0.13 0.09 -0.02 0.05 1.00 
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Table 4: Characteristics of Forests by Forest Status 
 
 Demarcated protected 
forests 
Civil Soyam 
forests 
Van panchayat 
forests 
 Mean 
(stand. dev.) 
Mean 
(stand. dev.) 
Mean 
(stand. dev.) 
Canopy cover (%) 39.4 
(10.6) 
34.6 
(11.2) 
36.8 
(11.6) 
Basal area (m2/ha) 52.4 
(26.4) 
37.8 
(20.3) 
41.9 
(20.8) 
Basal Volume (m3/ha) 1162.5 
(1011.9) 
502.3 
(514.5) 
673.7 
(580.9) 
% Lopped 65.4 
(12.7) 
68.4 
(13.8) 
63.6 
(13.5) 
Regeneration rate 
(saplings above 0.5m/ha.) 
386.5 
(316.2) 
486.4 
(357.2) 
512.8 
(275.4) 
Collection Time (hours) 4.1 
(1.3) 
3.6 
(1.0) 
3.6 
(1.2) 
% Broad leaf trees  50.02 
(41.5) 
85.6 
(27.9) 
78.0 
(34.5) 
Aspect 0.59 
(0.50) 
0.60 
(0.50) 
0.60 
(0.5) 
Slope (degrees) 33.6 
(4.9) 
30.7 
(5.1) 
31.1 
(4.4) 
Altitude (m) 2224.9 
(322.0) 
2119.7 
(273.9) 
2204.3 
(272.0) 
Distance from the village 
center (kms) 
2.71 
(1.7) 
1.7 
(0.9) 
1.6 
(1.1) 
Number of forests* 213 (178) 70 (64) 116 (104) 
 
* Parentheses: number of forests for which collection time is available  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26
Table 5: Forest Quality OLS regressions: Pooled Sample 
 
Parentheses: robust standard errors, clustered at village level 
***, **, *: significant at 1,5,10% respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Canopy 
cover 
Basal area
 
Basal 
Volume 
Lopping
 
Regeneration 
 
Collection 
time 
Dummy Van Panchayat 
forest 
-1.47 
(1.31) 
-3.65 
(2.68) 
-115.81 
(85.67) 
-4.16***
(1.60) 
60.71 
(37.06) 
0.03 
(.14) 
Dummy Civil Soyam forest -2.78* 
(1.60) 
-5.79* 
(3.03) 
-168.02** 
(79.39) 
-0.08 
(2.05) 
27.48 
(50.04) 
0.03 
(.14) 
Distance to the forest 1.08*** 
(.34) 
2.76*** 
(.98) 
95.38*** 
(32.91) 
-.97* 
(.50) 
0.63 
(9.45) 
.58*** 
(.06) 
Percentage Broad-leaf 0.01 
(.01) 
-.13*** 
(.02) 
-9.27*** 
(.93) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
2.23*** 
(.40) 
0.00 
(.00) 
Aspect 2.04 
(1.44) 
7.74*** 
(2.55) 
220.91*** 
(75.81) 
-0.30 
(1.62) 
83.15** 
(36.43) 
0.12 
(.13) 
Altitude .01*** 
(.00) 
.03*** 
(.00) 
.73*** 
(.19) 
-.004* 
(.00) 
-.10* 
(.05) 
0.00 
(.00) 
Slope 0.00 
(.11) 
-0.19 
(.24) 
-5.50 
(7.29) 
0.03 
(.15) 
-0.43 
(3.48) 
0.01 
(.01) 
Population density per ha -0.28 
(2.05) 
-1.92 
(4.36) 
4.87 
(170.12) 
-1.99 
(2.57) 
8.07 
(59.25) 
0.11 
(.20) 
Square of population density 0.35 
(.55) 
0.81 
(1.20) 
17.17 
(53.46) 
0.16 
(.74) 
-0.96 
(16.97) 
-0.08 
(.04) 
Hours to jeepable road -0.77 
(1.17) 
5.62** 
(2.43) 
219.68*** 
(78.20) 
0.01 
(1.43) 
-25.98 
(32.00) 
0.21 
(.13) 
Hours square to jeepable 
road 
0.05 
(.22) 
-0.76 
(.46) 
-35.63** 
(14.74) 
-0.06 
(.27) 
-0.90 
(6.38) 
-0.03 
(.02) 
Number of observations 399 399 399 399 399 346 
Number of Villages 83 83 83 83 83 83 
R-squared 0.12 0.28 0.38 0.06 0.13 0.39 
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Table 6: Forest Quality regressions with Village Fixed Effects 
 
Parentheses: robust standard errors, clustered at village level 
***, **, *: significant at 1,5,10% respectively 
 
 
  
Canopy 
cover 
Basal area
 
Basal 
Volume 
Lopping 
 
Regeneration
 
Collection 
time 
Dummy Van Panchayat 
forest 
3.01 
(2.55) 
0.63 
(4.05) 
53.90 
(126.71) 
-10.17*** 
(2.77) 
-30.15 
(57.31) 
-.40* 
(.21) 
Dummy Civil Soyam forest -1.99 
(1.96) 
-5.01 
(3.58) 
-10.45 
(94.42) 
-2.89 
(2.66) 
-36.35 
(49.81) 
-.37** 
(.18) 
Distance to the forest .99* 
(.53) 
3.44*** 
(1.12) 
112.38*** 
(33.00) 
-1.23* 
(.72) 
-15.20 
(12.28) 
.50*** 
(.08) 
Percentage Broad-leaf 0.03 
(.02) 
-.21*** 
(.04) 
-11.21*** 
(1.44) 
.07** 
(.03) 
.71* 
(.42) 
0.00 
(.00) 
Aspect 2.65 
(1.61) 
7.26*** 
(2.66) 
231.94*** 
(87.22) 
-1.00 
(2.47) 
114.33** 
(50.09) 
-0.10 
(.16) 
Altitude 0.00 
(.00) 
.03*** 
(.01) 
.87** 
(.42) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
.25** 
(.10) 
0.00 
(.00) 
Slope 0.12 
(.17) 
-0.01 
(.40) 
0.69 
(11.32) 
-0.23 
(.22) 
10.29* 
(6.08) 
0.02 
(.02) 
Number of observations 399 399 399 399 399 346 
Number of Villages 83 83 83 83 83 83 
R-squared 0.09 0.24 0.28 0.09 0.08 0.43 
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Table 7: Conditional Village Fixed Effect Logit for Likelihood of being a Van 
Panchayat forest   
  
Van Panchayat 
dummy 
Percentage Broad-leaf .01** 
(.01) 
Aspect 0.45 
(.74) 
Slope -0.005 
(.05) 
Altitude -0.001 
(.00) 
Distance to the forest -.67*** 
(.17) 
Number of observations1 184 
Number of Villages2 35 
Pseudo R-square 0.22 
1: Observations located in villages with both VP and Non-VP forests coexisting 
2: Number of Villages with both VP and Non-VP forests coexisting 
Parentheses: robust standard errors, clustered at village level 
***, **, *: significant at 1,5,10% respectively 
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Table 8: Forest Quality Regressions with Village Fixed Effects, with Controls for  
Composition of Neighboring Forests  
Parentheses: robust standard errors, clustered at village level; ***, **, *: significant at 
1,5,10% respectively 
 
 
Table 9: Dates of creation of the Van Panchayats 
 
 Number Percentage (%) 
After 2000 4 9 
1990s 6 13 
1980s 3 7 
1970s 7 16 
Before 1970 25 56 
Total 45 100 
 
  
Canopy 
cover 
Basal area
 
Basal 
Volume 
Lopping 
 
Regeneration
 
Collection 
time 
Dummy Van Panchayat 
forest 
5.27 
(3.42) 
-4.14 
(4.32) 
-18.09 
(133.98) 
-13.18*** 
(3.98) 
20.92 
(81.11) 
-0.19 
(.24) 
Dummy Civil Soyam forest 3.21 
(3.60) 
0.96 
(6.39) 
69.39 
(146.65) 
-9.17* 
(4.73) 
172.03* 
(100.46) 
-0.33 
(.28) 
Distance to the forest .92* 
(.51) 
3.48*** 
(1.10) 
111.00*** 
(33.61) 
-1.09 
(.69) 
-13.34 
(11.81) 
.48*** 
(.08) 
Percentage Broad-leaf .04* 
(.02) 
-.20*** 
(.04) 
-11.11*** 
(1.46) 
.06* 
(.03) 
.87* 
(.45) 
0.00 
(.00) 
Aspect 2.55 
(1.60) 
7.08** 
(2.70) 
227.48** 
(88.12) 
-0.82 
(2.45) 
113.94** 
(50.09) 
-0.10 
(.15) 
Altitude 0.00 
(.00) 
.03*** 
(.01) 
.87** 
(.41) 
-.01* 
(.01) 
.26** 
(.11) 
0.00 
(.00) 
Slope 0.15 
(.14) 
0.07 
(.35) 
1.76 
(11.16) 
-0.26 
(.17 ) 
11.97** 
(4.63) 
0.02 
(.02) 
Competing Van Panchayat 
forest area (ha) 
0.00 
(.02) 
-.06** 
(.03) 
-1.17 
(.94) 
0.01 
(.03) 
0.27 
(.40) 
0.00 
(.00) 
Competing State protected 
forest area (ha) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
0.03 
(.04) 
0.14 
(1.20) 
.06** 
(.03) 
-0.61 
(.57) 
-.005** 
(.00) 
Competing Civil Soyam 
forest area (ha) 
0.15 
(.15) 
0.33 
(.28) 
3.56 
(5.42) 
-0.14 
(.20) 
8.64* 
(4.98) 
-0.01 
(.01) 
Number of observations 399 399 399 399 399 346 
Number of Villages 83 83 83 83 83 83 
R-squared 0.11 0.25 0.29 0.11 0.12 0.45 
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Table 10: Forest Quality Regressions with Village Fixed Effects, and Separate 
Effect of Old and New Van Panchayats 
Note: robust standard errors, clustered at village level 
***, **, *: significant at 1,5,10% respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Canopy 
cover 
Basal area
 
Basal 
Volume 
Lopping 
 
Regeneration
 
Collection 
time 
New Van Panchayat 
0.06 
(2.86) 
-12.56**
(5.68) 
-288.75 
(227.27) 
-6.70* 
(3.55) 
-8.34 
(66.83) 
-0.12 
(.23) 
Old Van Panchayat 
9.35** 
(4.30) 
2.47 
(5.24) 
194.33 
(141.72) 
-18.26*** 
(4.56) 
43.89 
(116.12) 
-0.25 
(.30) 
Dummy Civil Soyam forest 3.68 
(3.50) 
1.72 
(6.39) 
93.80 
(151.65) 
-9.76** 
(4.58) 
174.67* 
(100.90) 
-0.34 
(.28) 
Distance to the forest 1.04** 
(.48) 
3.67*** 
(1.11) 
117.25*** 
(33.45) 
-1.24* 
(.65) 
-12.67 
(11.88) 
.47*** 
(.08) 
Percentage Broad-leaf .04* 
(.02) 
-.20*** 
(.04) 
-11.15*** 
(1.44) 
.06* 
(.03) 
.86* 
(.45) 
0.00 
(.00) 
Aspect 2.38 
(1.53) 
6.82** 
(2.64) 
218.97** 
(87.14) 
-0.61 
(2.36) 
113.02** 
(50.78) 
-0.09 
(.15) 
Altitude 0.00 
(.00) 
.03*** 
(.01) 
.81** 
(.39) 
-0.01 
(.01) 
.26** 
(.11) 
0.00 
(.00) 
Slope 0.14 
(.14) 
0.05 
(.35) 
1.09 
(11.01) 
-0.25 
(.17) 
11.90** 
(4.60) 
0.02 
(.02) 
Competing Van Panchayat 
forest area (ha) 
0.01 
(.02) 
-0.04 
(.03) 
-0.65 
(.81) 
0.00 
(.03) 
0.33 
(.48) 
0.00 
(.00) 
Competing State protected 
forest area (ha) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
0.03 
(.04) 
0.19 
(1.23) 
.06** 
(.03) 
-0.60 
(.56) 
-.004** 
(.00) 
Competing Civil Soyam 
forest area (ha) 
0.14 
(.15) 
0.32 
(.28) 
3.36 
(5.50) 
-0.14 
(.20) 
8.61* 
(5.02) 
-0.01 
(.01) 
Number of observations 399 399 399 399 399 346 
Number of Villages 83 83 83 83 83 83 
R-squared 0.13 0.26 0.30 0.13 0.12 0.45 
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Table A1:  Within and Between Variation in Forest Quality Measures across 
Plots 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev.
Canopy overall 44.09 16.93
 Cover between   4.88
  within   16.76
Basal overall 54.71 37.77
 Area between   9.30
  within   37.57
Basal overall 1152.13 1305.57
 Volume between   359.72
  within   1289.38
Lopping overall 65.93 16.53
  between   7.28
  within   16.34
Regeneration overall 382.15 380.00
  between   122.14
  within   372.75
 
Table A2             Rules of Use in State Forests 
 
ACTIVITY 
 
RULES OF USE 
 
Grazing  
 
Open access unless specified for instance when a plantation 
zone has been created by the forest department when access is 
closed 
Grazing (migratory 
patoralism) 
 
Permits are required from the forest department (usually a 
pittance per livestock). These permits enable access to vast 
alpine pastures which are the main summer grazing grounds  for 
such migratory pastoralists 
Firewood collection Only dry wood can be lopped or collected. 
Fodder collection(leaf) Only tertiary branches can be lopped without hampering the tree 
Fodder collection(grass) Open access 
Leaf-litter accumulation Open access 
Timber 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a ban on "green" felling. However, limited extractions 
are permitted. In Uttarakhand, the "panchayat" approaches the 
forest department and the forest department grants approvals at 
the village level. Once approvals are received, the "panchayat" 
has the authority to distribute the trees after examining the 
demands expressed by approached households. 
Medicinal Herb Collection 
 
Permits are required from the forest department for collecting 
medicinal herbs usually found in alpine pastures or in the 
vicinity of high altitude villages. 
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Table A3:  Summary Statistics of Variables in the Regressions   
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
% Canopy cover 37.42 12.43 
% lopped 66.57 13.83 
Basal area (m2/ha) 41.81 20.69 
Basal Volume (m3/ha) 586.11 470.13 
Regeneration (number of saplings above 50cm/ha) 516.34 331.89 
Collection Time per bundle of firewood (hours) 3.92 1.23 
Dummy state forest 0.40 0.49 
Dummy Van Panchayat forest 0.36 0.48 
Dummy Civil Soyam forest 0.25 0.43 
Distance to the forest (km) 2.19 1.38 
Aspect 0.58 0.40 
Altitude (feet) 2196.54 236.36 
Slope (degrees) 31.73 4.61 
Population density per ha 0.84 0.73 
Time to jeepable road (hrs) 1.35 1.61 
Competing area of Van Panchayat forests (ha) 87.62 162.43 
Competing area of State protected forests (ha) 95.35 108.01 
Competing area of Civil Soyams (ha) 29.75 52.53 
Dummy old Van Panchayat 0.28 0.45 
Dummy new Van Panchayat 0.07 0.26 
Note: * mean for dummies relate to proportion of the dummy type with respect 
to all types of forests. 
 
 
